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Now, when I am fighting with cancer of the colon, I came to the
opinion that most (or even any) case of cancer is an
inconsistency occurring in the world, which should be taken as
the paradigmatic case by any true dialectical theory. I am
therefore preparing myself to become a Hegelian after death.
—Jerzy Perzanowski (2001)
1 Introduction
Inconsistencies are usually rejected not just because they are (considered to
be) false or because from them anything follows, according to classical logic.
Inconsistencies can actually have very dangerous practical consequences. For
instance, the parallel use of the metric and the traditional Anglo-American
systems of measures caused a maladjustment in the trajectory of the Mars
Climate Orbiter that led to its destruction in 1990 (cf. Alder 2003, p. 11).
Note that these systems contradict each other only because they express
different languages or conventions for measuring the same reality, and in no
way do they presuppose different theories about the world: what we say in
one system can be said in the other without altering the meaning.
Inconsistencies about the nature of reality might result in deeper
incompatibilities, which justifies the aversion that most scientists and
philosophers have to them. Before going further we need to introduce some
conventions which will allow us to speak about our scientific representations
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of the world. The shortest kind of signs whereby we convey information about
the world are sentences, statements or propositions, which we will represent
by lower-case Greek letters α, β, etc. Some particular sentences, like “Nina
has blue pants”, are especially connected to experience and can be verified
by experience, given some observations. These sentences are often known as
observation sentences, which I will denote with φ and ψ.
Scientific theories can be represented as sets of sentences closed under a
logical relation of consequence. That is, we start by a finite set of scientific
laws (see sec. 2.1) and add to this set all the logical consequences that we
can obtain from those statements, including the observational sentences that
follow from them. If A is a finite set of sentences, and ` is a relation of
logical consequence, then T = A` is a scientific theory. In what follows, I
will use just T` to denote a theory closed with respect to `.
This way to represent scientific theories corresponds to what is know as
the syntactical view. In this view, the relation of consequence ` has the
properties of the classical consequence relation, which satisfies the principle
of explosion, according to which ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet (from a
contradiction, anything follows):
Postulate 1 (Principle of explosion). α,¬α ` β, for all α and β.
A consequence relation is explosive iff it satisfies explosion.
Definition 2 (Explosive consequence relation). The consequence relation `
is explosive iff it satisfies postulate 1.
The classical relation of consequence is explosive, for it satisfies the
principle of explosion; but not all explosive relations are classical. A
paraconsistent relation of consequence is one where where the principle of
explosion does not hold in general. That is, a paraconsistent relation of
consequence is just a no-explosive one. This is can be expressed by the
following definition:
Definition 3 (Paraconsistent consequence relation). The consequence
relation ` is paraconsistent iff α,¬α 0 β, for some α and β.
Following Gotesky (1968), Bartelborth (1989, pp. 95–6) and Priest
(2006a, p. 144), we can classify the inconsistencies that we can find in
empirical or factual science into three groups:
Factual: Inconsistencies between a theory T` and a verified observational
statement φ, where T ` ¬φ. (cf. Gotesky 1968, p. 488)
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External: Inconsistencies between theories T`1 , ...,T
`
n that aim to describe
the same system, but that “attribute different natures to the same
thing or arrive at different conclusions about it” (Gotesky 1968, p. 484),
implying mutually contradictory statements.
Internal: Which characterises a theory T` that entails two contradictory
sentences, so that both T ` α and T ` ¬α mutually hold.
We can summarise the traditional theses about each type of inconsistency
as follows:
Factual: If a theory is inconsistent with the data, then it is false.
External: If two theories contradict each other, at least one of them is false.
Internal: An internally inconsistent theory is trivial (entails everything)
and, therefore, useless.
Davey (2014) calls counter-tradition to the spectrum of ideas —mainly
associated to the paraconsistent programme— that moderately or radically
challenge at least one of the theses above.
Although there are very few books exclusively dedicated to this subject
(see Vickers 2013), it is worth mentioning that the study of inconsistency in
empirical sciences has been very well represented in collective publications
like Meheus (2002) and Mart´ınez-Ordaz and Estrada-Gonza´lez (2017).
Furthermore, in December 2019, the first workshop on Inconsistency in
Factual Science was held in Rio de Janeiro, as part of the First World
Congress of the Academia Brasileira de Filosofia.
2 Factual inconsistencies
Du hast dich da arg vergessen, du hast den Humor meines
kleinen Theaters durchbrochen und eine Schweinerei angerichtet,
du hast mit Messern gestochen und unsre hu¨bsche Bilderwelt mit
Wirklichkeitsflecken besudelt. ... Mit dieser Figur hast du leider
nicht umzugehen verstanden – ich glaubte, du habest das Spiel
besser gelernt. Nun, es la¨ßt sich korrigieren.
—Hermann Hesse, Der Steppenwolf (1927)
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2.1 The tradition on factual inconsistencies
We learn from failure, not from success!
—Vlad T, epes, , Dracula (Bram Stoker, 1897)
Factual inconsistencies occur when our theories or scientific laws are
contradicted by observations. Scientific laws, are perhaps the most
interesting scientific statements, and also the most difficult to justify. Where
Sx stands for “x is a swan” and Wx for “x is white”, the law-like statement:
Sentence 4. All swans are white. ∀x(Sx→Wx)
states that all possible individuals of a class (the class of swans) belong to
another class (the class of white coloured things). Scientific laws have the
logical form universal sentences, which is why they are so difficult to justify,
for we cannot test all individuals that can possibly belong to some class. No
matter our conventions, we simply cannot see that all swans are white.
Now, although we cannot verify 4, we can verify an instance where it
holds, like:
Sentence 5. The swan a is white. Sa ∧Wa
which states that the individual a that belongs to a class (the class of swans)
also belongs to another class (the class fo white coloured things). Sentence 5
is a verifiable sentence that logically follows from 4 (assuming a is in the
domain of discourse), which means that 5 is a potential corroborator of 4.
Accordingly, sentence 5 is also a potential corroborator of any theory T` such
that T ` ∀x(Sx→Wx), for it would also be the case that T ` Sa ∧Wa.
Popper calls corroboration to the process whereby we verify the
empirically verifiable consequences of a theory. It is in this sense that
“theories cannot be verified; but they can be corroborated” (1935, p. 185).1
However, Popper does not propose to accept a theory because it has been
sufficiently corroborated, but because it has resisted several attempts to
falsify it.
1With regard to the term “corroborate”, see the following footnote of the English
edition: “Carnap translated my term ‘degree of corroboration’ (‘Grad der Bewa¨hrung ’)
[...] as ‘degree of confirmation’. [...] I did not like this term, because some of its
associations (‘make firm’; ‘establish firmly’; ‘put beyond doubt’; ‘prove’; ‘verify’: ‘to
confirm’ corresponds more closely to ‘erha¨rten’ or ‘besta¨tigen’ than to ‘bewa¨hren’). [...]
I fell within his usage, thinking that words do not matter. [...] Yet it turned out that I
was mistaken: the associations of the word ‘confirmation’ did matter, unfortunately, and
made themselves felt: ‘degree of confirmation’ was soon used —by Carnap himself— as a
synonym (or ‘explicans’) of ‘probability’” (Popper 2002, ch. 10, n. ∗1)
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It may be though that, if we can corroborate for sufficiently many x
that Sx ∧Wx, then we could infer that ∀x(Sx → Wx). Often known as
incomplete induction (induction from now on), this kind of inference goes
“from singular sentences describing, for example, observations, experiments,
etc., to universal sentences, hypotheses or theories” (Popper 1935, §1).
Notwithstanding this, induction poses several challenges.
First, as the logical empiricists noticed, there is some arbitrariness to
what constitute a valid inductive inference. Carnap, for example, warned of
the hypothetical character that scientific laws have with respect to singular
statements, and of the latter with respect to protocol sentences (1931, p. 400).
Neurath, for his part, pointed out that the induction that makes it possible
to obtain laws is justified by a decision (Entschluss) and that, therefore, all
attempts to justify it are logically bound to fail. Hence, for him there can
be no other concept of scientific truth that does not express, at bottom, our
failure to try to falsify (1931, p. 299).
This idea is further developed by Popper when he characterises scientific
theories as partially decidable (teilentscheidbare) systems of statements,
in that they are “logically unverifiable, but unilaterally falsifiable” (1932,
p. 426). This is due to the asymmetry between the possibility of falsifying
and verifying a universal statement. While verifying 4 would require the
verification of all its infinite instances, disproving it would only require
falsifying one of its counter-instances expressed in a singular statement such
as:
Sentence 6. The swan a is not white. Sa ∧ ¬Wa
which states that the individual a that belongs to a class (the class of swans)
does not belong to another class (the class fo white coloured things). This
statement has the logical form of a singular statement, and it is related to 4
in a very special way because, according to classical logic, they cannot be
both true at the same time. This means that sentence 5 is a potential falsifier
of sentence 4, and of any theory T` such that T ` ∀x(Sx→Wx).
It is in this sense that the epistemological tradition maintains that a
theory is false whenever it is inconsistent with the data. The falsification of
a theory is much more tricky than it may seem, though. From the counter-
tradition, Priest points out that no scientific theory is discarded because of
a contrary observation, for we could simply treat it as an anomaly (2006a,
p. 145). None of this goes against anything stated by the tradition, even
removing Kuhn (1996), Lakatos (1978) and Feyerabend (1981) from it.
Popper’s falsificationism was criticised by Reichenbach on the grounds
that no scientific theory is really disproved by a counter-example (1932,
p. 428). In his response to Logik der Forschung, he adds that we can
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always explain an inconsistency between a theory and a fact (i.e. a
factual inconsistency) by “shifting the error” from the theory itself to the
determination of fact (1935, p. 270). Reichenbach addressed this by defining
scientific truth in probabilistic terms, where a true scientific statement has,
by definition, a very high probability equivalent to certainty, and a a false
one, a very low probability equivalent to impossibility (1936, p. 269).
In this framework, Reichenbach updated the principle of induction into
a probabilistic one, that would allow us to infer that 4 is (probably) true if
we can verify sufficiently many sentences like 5. The most attractive feature
of this treatment in terms of factual inconsistencies is that it allows us to
justify belief in a scientific law in spite of some irrelevant counter-evidence,
whereas the falsificationist treatment seems much less forgiving with respect
to negative evidence.
This apparent unforgivingness of falsificationism suggested Neurath a
change in terminology similar to the one proposed by Popper. While
the latter speaks of “corroboration” instead of “verification”, the former
speaks of “shaking” or “distress” (Erschu¨tterung) instead of “falsification”.
Furthermore, he opposes both Reichenbach’s and Popper’s attempts to
propose a general methodology of induction or control, respectively,
applicable to any theory of any discipline.
He also criticises Popper’s analysis of scientific theories as well-defined
abstract systems, free of ambiguities, and with very clear logical relationships.
Such an analysis, according to Neurath, is not applicable to all scientific
theories because the statements “that we actually work with use many
imprecise terms, so that ‘systems’ can only stand out as abstractions” (1935,
p. 354). He proposed, instead, to analyse scientific theories as encyclopedias
chosen by a researcher according to the nature of the object studied, and
whose logical relationships with experience are not determined by a general
model of scientific testing. This does not imply that there should not be some
effective way of connecting such encyclopedias with observational statements.
However, no general method of induction or control should determine in
advance the nature of this connection for all scientific theories.
Neurath thus proposes a broader model of scientific theorisation and
testing, which has Popperian systems as a special case. Although he
criticises Popper’s universal representation of scientific theories as systems,
he recognises that Popper’s and Reichenbach’s proposals sufficiently explain
certain domains of scientific theorisation —in contrast to Popper, who
entirely rejects Reichenbach’s proposal.
Critics of falsificationism often omit Popper’s distinction between the
logical and practical senses of falsifiability (cf. 1935, §9; 1989). The former is
about the logical properties of theories, so that a theory will be falsifiable as
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long as it is incompatible with a non-empty class of observational statements
(1935, §21). The second is more about the practical possibility of disproving
the theory. so that “theories that are falsifiable in the first sense are never
falsifiable in the second” (1989, p. 84).
We cannot reject a theory on the basis of a few contrary observations.
However, that some statements are logically incompatible with a theory is
what determines the potential comparative success of a research programme
and the logical possibility that a empirical theory be false. Although
theoretical proposals (see sec. 3.1) do not have translucent logical connections,
the our best theories do. This is why we can at least demand from such
theories that they establish a priori what facts could possibly falsify them or,
at least, shake them. This even if it were in practice impossible to determine
whether such facts have occurred.
2.2 The counter-tradition on factual inconsistencies
A more counter-traditional claim was made by da Costa, according to whom
“the operation of falsification [...] consists in the appropriate restriction
of the domains of application of theories (including laws and hypotheses)”
(1997, p. 199). In this sense, da Costa proposes that a theory that has
enjoyed sufficient confirmation is never falsified, but only restricted in its
field of application. This is openly opposed to epistemological and scientific
tradition because some falsified hypotheses, such as the Ptolemaic model
of the Solar System, have been definitively abandoned and are considered
strictly false.
Martinez-Ordaz, for her part, contributed an interesting distinction
between independent and auxiliary factual inconsistencies. Let T be a
empirical theory and S, the theory used for the design of an experiment.
We say that an inconsistency between T and an observation is independent
when the intersection between the relevant assumptions of T and S for this
experiment is empty, and auxiliary otherwise (Mart´ınez-Ordaz 2017, p. 142).
Independent inconsistencies are factual inconsistencies that do not depend
on the interaction between the assumptions of T and S. We cannot assert
the same about auxiliary inconsistencies since it is not easy to determine to
what extent the inconsistency is due to the interaction between S y T.
Another interesting contribution goes against one of Popper’s strongest
claims about the nature of empirical science. He differentiates the role of logic
in formal and empirical sciences in that, whereas in the former logic is used
for proofs, “for the transmission of truth,” in the latter is used critically, “for
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the retransmission of falsity.”2 The critical use of logic in empirical science
would, thus, demand that the testing (logical) framework, that is, the logic
we use for comparing our theories with data, has to be “a very strong logic,
the strongest logic, so to speak, which is at our disposal.” Consequently, we
have to “use the full or classical or two-valued logic” (1979, p. 305).
The testing framework should not be confused with the logic presupposed
by a theory. For example, if a theory presupposes a paraconsistent logic
and is empirically consistent, we can use classical logic as a testing logical
framework without any problem. Popper’s claim is quite reasonable because,
being highly intolerant of inconsistencies, classical logic is excellent for
retransmitting falsehood. Whether a logic is suitable as testing framework
and particularly for falsification, depends precisely on its capacity to
retransmit falsehood.
However, Tennant (1985) proved that intuitionistic and minimal logics are
as suitable as classical logic for this purpose. However, this does not seem
to be the case of paraconsistent logic, since its tolerance to inconsistency
can prevent it from ever retransmitting falsehood. This does not seem to
have been disputed by the counter-tradition, whose main work has been the
analysis of external and internal inconsistencies.
3 External inconsistencies
If I’m going to have a past, I prefer it to be multiple choice.
—The Joker, The Killing Joke (Alan Moore, 1988)
The main problems concerning external inconsistencies also concern
internal ones: What kind of epistemic commitment exists towards two
theories that are inconsistent with each other or towards an internally
inconsistent theory? On the other side, is a scientist who operates
with inconsistencies rational and could such rationality be explained by a
paraconsistent logic? In this section I address these questions for both types
of inconsistencies, and in the next one I discuss the problems unique to
internal inconsistencies.
2Cf. Priest’s (2006b, p. 84) claim that: “[T]he central uses of deductive argument are
(i) to stablish new truths from old (as in mathematics) and (ii) to establish old falsehoods
from new (as in experimental refutation).”
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3.1 Epistemic commitment
This is an imaginary story —which may never happen, but then
again may. ... This is an imaginary story...
Aren’t they all?
—Alan Moore, Whatever Happened to the Man of Tomorrow?
(1986)
Some authors believe that the adequate strength of epistemic commitment
to inconsistent information must be weaker than that of belief. This is
because an inconsistent body of knowledge cannot possibly be true even
if we can operate with it through a paraconsistent logic. If we are talking
about external inconsistencies, at least one of the theories must be false.
This leads Madan to the counter-intuitive proposal that “a rational
scientific objective would be to find [...] factually adequate theories” that
are “maximally inconsistent” with respect to each other (1983, p. 453). This
objective is reasonable because, the theories being only approximations, there
is no impediment to having theories that contradict each other if both have
empirical support. This is especially so in disciplines that do not have a
unified theory, but rather several theories that are incompatible with each
other but that explain different aspects of the same problem. Madan goes
further saying that believes that aiming to maximise inconsistencies could
prevent the “disillusionment faced by economics students brought up to
believe their subject is a science like physics” (1983, p. 454). This proposal
seems to be incompatible with scientific realism because it assumes that
science —or at least economics— often allows “proposition to be false in the
actual world, yet true often enough to warrant attention” (1983, p. 454).
However, there are also proposals that try to make scientific realism
compatible with an inconsistent science. The concept of acceptance,
originally proposed by Bas van Fraassen (1980), is used for this purpose
understood as “an epistemic attitude intermediate between belief and mere
entertainment” (2007, p. 117). We say that we accept a theory when we treat
it as if we believed that it is true, or at least its observational consequences.
In Lipton’s words, van Fraassen looks at our beliefs so that they do “not
go too far above or beyond the evidence” (2007, p. 121). Consequently, to
affirm that a theory is true may be a sufficient but not necessary for having
a realistic commitment towards a theory or a set of theories (Brown 1990,
p. 281).
For this reason, Brown proposes to accept an inconsistent set of sentences
if it provides “the best and most general account available of their domains”,
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but also to establish “contextual limits on that commitment so as to avoid
bringing incompatible claims into play at any point” (1990, p. 285). Lipton
proposes instead that we should reduce our belief “must accept because our
belief has to be lowered from the full theory in the face of the contradiction”
(2007, p. 121). In this sense, it is possible to reduce the original theory or
theories to a consistent set of statements, none of which has been deduced
from the contradictions of the original system (2007, p. 128).
This line of thought has been criticised by Joel Smith, who coined
the concept of proposal “to refer simply to a collection of statements”,
reserving the concept of theory for denoting deductively closed collections
of statements. (1988b, p. 429). When the deductive closure of a proposal
results in an inconsistent theory, it is not correct to say that we believe
or accept the resulting theory. Instead, the theoretical scientists “uses the
original proposal along with the confirming evidence available for various
parts of that proposal to give a schematic “projection” of what the consistent
replacement theory (or some fragment of that theory) will look like” (1988b,
p. 438). This is why, for Smith, inconsistent theories cannot be treated as
final theories whose acceptance must be justified, since inconsistent theories
can only be studied within the context of discovery.3
For their part, da Costa and French they regard the abandonment of belief
in the logical consequences of our proposals “is a radical move to make under
any circumstances since it places these scientific developments, profoundly
important as they are, beyond the reach of logic altogether” (2002, p. 111).
They propose instead to understand scientific truth not in the frame of
the correspondence theory, but as quasi-truth. In this conception, scientific
theories are always partially true, which means that we have an epistemic
commitment to them, but of a different nature.4 This simplifies things for it
is no longer necessary to establish the contextual limits proposed by Brown.5
Davey questions whether scientists’ epistemic commitment toward their
inconsistent theories implies belief in their own inconsistencies. For example,
liquids can be treated as (1) continuous distributions of matter (as proposed
by Navier-Stokes) or as (2) very large sets of particles executing random
movements (Davey 2014). In spite of being these treatments mutually
3This refers Reichenbach’s distinction between the contexts of discovery and
justification Reichenbach (1961, §1).
4The concept of partial truth depends on the concept simple pragmatic structure da
Costa (1997, ch. III) and da Costa and French (2002, sec. 4).
5“However, one may wonder if it is even possible to effect the clear cut division between
different ‘contexts’ or ‘sub-sets’ withing a theory that this account requires. Even in the
Bohr example it can be questioned whether there was quite the ‘systematic division’ of
contexts that this approeach requires.” (da Costa and French 2002, p. 108)
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inconsistent, Davey does not regard the belief of scientists in such theories
as problematic since they need not believe in the literal truth of either (1)
or (2), let alone of both together.
Of course, the physicist is committed to the claim that for
certain purposes it suffices to treat a liquid [(1)] and that for
other purposes it suffices to treat a liquid as [(2)] —but there is
nothing logically inconsistent in that, any more than there is an
inconsistency between the mother who in ordinary circumstances
says that her son is 5 feet tall and the very careful doctor who
says that he is 5.01 feet tall. (Davey 2014, p. 3018)
In short, Davey argues that the only way to find an inconsistency in a
physicist’s beliefs under (1) and (2) is to believe that there is a commitment to
the literal truth of all the theories he uses. It is not clear, however, whether
da Costa’s proposal for partial knowledge, which comes from the counter-
tradition, is compatible with Davey’s proposal. Perhaps what is at the heart
of this discussion is the nature of the epistemic commitment with scientific
theories and hypotheses, a problem that is common to both tradition and
counter-tradition.
3.2 Rationality
If there are inconsistent proposals or theories in science that we consider
valid, we must in some way reject the generality of the ex contradictione
sequitur quodlibet. However, it is not clear in what way we should do so. In
the case of two mutually inconsistent theories T`1 y T
`
2 it could suffice to
believe in their union T`1 ∪T`2 , but not in its deductive closure (T`1 ∪T`2 )`
—where ` is the classical relation of consequence. This would mean to
believe every statement of T`1 and T
`
2 , including the contradictory pairs
of statements, but in no logical consequence (classical or otherwise) of the
union of both theories. This because, even if T`1 ∪T`2 were inconsistent,
it would not be trivial as (T`1 ∪T`2 )` would be. To believe α ∈ T`1 and
¬α ∈ T`2 would not automatically make us believe anything for our belief is
not logically closed on their union. If non-triviality is a necessary condition
of rationality, then belief in two inconsistent theories does not automatically
entail irrationality.
A different case is that of internally inconsistent theories. Unless we
treat them only as proposals in Smith’s sense, classical closure makes them
trivial and therefore useless to science. It seems that here we do need a
paraconsistent logic to prevent inconsistent theories from becoming trivial.
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Something similar happens when we want to use two inconsistent T1 and
T2 theories to derive, for example, technological applications. What if T1
and T2 offer complementary technical applications but at the same time are
mutually inconsistent? A similar problem arises for theories with verified
predictions that we later prove to be inconsistent. How do we justify these
predictions and not their negations? How do we justify the acceptance of
the applied technologies of T1 and T2 without getting lost in their mutual
inconsistency?
In the logic-driven strategy we avoid triviality by assuming that ` in
T
` is a paraconsistent relationship. This would also make it possible to
believe in the logical closure of (T`1 ∪ T`2 )`P ; where ` is still classic but `P,
paraconsistent. Several works have been done in this line of research.
Drago (2002) has argued that classical logic has not been the only logical
framework presupposed by scientists, and that there are historical examples
of intuitionist and paraconsistent reasoning in science; examples of the latter
would be Lobachevsky’s treatment of his geometry and Carnot’s treatment
of thermodynamics.
The main area of research, however, is that of rational reconstructions
of the logical procedure with which certain theories operate. For example,
multi-deductive logic was developed by de Souza, da Costa, and others in
order to unify incompatible physical theories within a single formal system.
Thus, classical particle mechanics, classical particle electromagnetism and
Bohr’s quantisation postulates can be unified into a formal system despite
their incompatibilities. These theories would be closed with respect to a
multi-deductive relationship `S3 which, due to incompatibilities between the
basic theories, must be a paraconsistent relationship. This unification is not
the one aspired by physicists, but it could be represented with that scheme
if “the same logic is maintained and there is no incompatibility between the
theories” (de Souza 2000, p. 259).
On the other hand, Brown, Priest and others have developed a strategy
called Chunk and Permeate, with which they have analysed the infinitesimal
calculus, Bohr’s atomic model and Dirac’s δ function. Following this
line of research Friend and Mart´ınez-Ordaz (2018) studied the interaction
between the Liquid Drop Model and the Shell Model of the atomic nucleus.
Both mutually inconsistent models are used together to extract predictions
that neither can achieve alone. Scientists must therefore work with a
paraconsistent reasoning strategy that allows interaction between both
models two while avoiding triviality. Such a strategy is called Bundle
Chunk and Permeate, which is an extension of Chunk and Permeate that
incorporates Abramsky’s fibre analysis.
The logic-driven strategy is implicitly guided by da Costa’s principle of
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systematisation, according to which “reason is always expressed by means of
a logic” (1994, p. 45). This principle applied to inconsistency, however, may
interpreted as if the scientist and the philosopher is always rational when
dealing with an inconsistency. This, of course, cannot possibly be true about
each particular action and decision made by scientists.
In the content-driven strategy, the inconsistencies of a theory are solved
in favour of the system we try to describe with our theory. In this way, if
we have that T ` α and T ` ¬α, we have to carefully select which of α
and ¬α makes more sense about they content of the system we are aiming
to describe with our theory. Needless to say, if we do not want ` to be
paraconsistent, then we must conceive T as a proposal rather than a theory.
Within this content-driven strategy are Norton’s studies on the Quantum
Theory of Black-body Radiation (1987) and on the Newtonian Theory of
Gravitation (2002), as well as Smith’s (1988b; 1988a).
The premise of this strategy is that inconsistencies are a consequence
of the axioms by which we formalise our theoretical representations of the
world, and not necessarily of the representations themselves. Hence, it is in
principle possible to resolve these inconsistencies by referring back to those
representations. If the technological applications of two theories are mutually
inconsistent in terms of accuracy, this may be easily solved by deciding how
interested we are in accuracy and simplicity, for this context. The problem
with this strategy, though, is that no effective method has been proposed to
solve the theoretical inconsistencies. But again, had we such method, the
content-driven strategy could be reduced to the logic-driven strategy, for we
could build a logic where either α or ¬α (or non) would be a theorem of our
theory.
According to the epistemological tradition, at least one of two mutually
inconsistent theories has to be false. This does not go against what most
of the counter-tradition defends. For example, the family of non-adjunctive
approaches avoid triviality by isolating the consistent parts of a theory so
that contradictions never appear simultaneously. However, there are those
who defend the possibility that these inconsistencies are not a defect to be
avoided. For these authors, certain (internally or mutually) inconsistent
theories perhaps should not be accepted in spite of their inconsistencies,
but precisely because of them. This is because they argue that the world is,
in a sense, inconsistent. This thesis can be referred to as factual dialetheism,
and is best understood in the discussion of internal inconsistencies.
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4 Internal inconsistencies
Internally inconsistent theories present at least two problems that we have
not discussed yet. First, does it make sense to talk ask whether there are
true contradictions about the world? And, if so, how should we proceed to
accept them or reject them? In what follows, I will discuss these problems.
4.1 Contradictory facts
Yo vi una Rueda alt´ısima, que no estaba delante de mis ojos, ni
detra´s, ni a los lados, sino en todas partes, a un tiempo. Esa
Rueda estaba hecha de agua, pero tambie´n de fuego, y era
(aunque se ve´ıa el borde) infinita.
—Jorge Luis Borges, La escritura del Dios (1949)
Perhaps the first to address with logical rigour the possibility of true
contradictions with logical rigour was Jan  Lukasiewicz, who may be
considered the spiritual father of the counter-tradition. He criticised the
arguments advanced by Aristotle for, what he calls, the logic, ontological
and psychological formulations of the principle of (non) contradiction
 Lukasiewicz (1910, §1).  Lukasiewicz points out an ignoratio elenchi in the
arguments by which the Stagirite pretended to justify that no contradictory
statement can be true, with an argument that only establishes that not all
contradictory statements can be true (1910, p. 28).6
This leads da Costa (1994) to conclude that the existence of true factual
contradictions can only be established a posteriori. He also argues that it
is easier to verify the hypothesis that there are true contradictions than to
falsify it. Whereas verifying it would only require to verify the existence of
a single factual contradiction, falsifying it would require to falsify infinitely
many cases.7
Arenhart objects to this that scientific practice in the face of
inconsistencies has always been to try to eliminate them; which has always
been achieved for internal theoretical inconsistencies. To assume that one
should proceed otherwise implies that scientists have “made some wrong
6Mignucci (1996) presents a more formalised version of this criticism.
7“O que se pode dizer, no tanto, e´ que a priori, especialmente apelando para a lo´gica,
na˜o se justifica nem se podem banir as contradic¸o˜es. A existeˆncia ou na˜o de contradic¸o˜es
reais so´ se establecera´ a posteriori pela cieˆncia. E, como tudo sugere, afigura-se mais fa´cil
provar a verdade da tese de Hegel, do que sua falsidade; com efeito, uma constatac¸a˜o,
apenas, de contradic¸a˜o real, comprovaria a tese de Hegel, ao passo que nenhum nu´mero
finito de constatac¸o˜es seria suficiente para falsifica´-la.” (da Costa 1994, p. 208)
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moves in providing for such an elimination, so that the contradictions should
be allowed to stay” (2018, pp. 20–1). All of which would result in the
speculation that some internally inconsistent theories were wrongly replaced
for a consistent substitute, in spite of the fact that there was nothing wrong
with them. In this way we “would end up hanging to the science that could
have been, instead of the science that actually is” (2018, p. 21).
4.2 Observing inconsistencies
A contradiction in terminis implies no more than an impropriety
of speech. Those things which men understand by improper and
contradictious phrases may be sometimes really in nature
without any contradiction at all.
—Isaac Newton, Letter III (1693)
What we may call factual dialetheism does not require empirical dialetheism.
That is, that there are contradictory facts does mean that we can experience
them directly. In science, we test the existence of unobservable entities by
means of observable ones, where the existence of the latter is deduced from
that of the former. Similarly, unverifiable statements are tested through
verifiable statements, where the truth of the former implies the truth of
the latter. This is why an inconsistent theory could have consistent sets of
potential corroborators and falsifiers.
However, it would not make sense for the dialetheist programme to accept
an inconsistent theory if it is not corroborated qua inconsistent. This would
not be necessary if its inconsistency was considered a defect to be corrected,
but this is not what dialetheism states. But then we run into the problem of
whether it is possible to observe or experience an inconsistent state of affairs.
In this respect Gotesky remarked that even if, by some law of nature, it
was impossible for something to have incompatible properties, “such a law
would not be able to inform us, in advance, of the properties which are, in
any given case, incompatible or contradictory” (1968, p. 473). This idea is
specified by Bobenrieth, for whom negation “does not reflect or represent
something in reality but something that we do with reality” (2007, p. 508)
because “negation is an operation that occurs by virtue of our category
schemes” (1996, p. 407).
Nevertheless, in spite of Bobenrieth’s argument against this, some
possible observations can still be interpreted as incompatible according to
our assumptions for interpreting our observations. In fact, according to
Priest’s empirical dialetheism “seeing that is always an interpretative process,
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and inference may well play some role in a rational reconstruction of how it
proceeds” (2006a, p. 59) — and the like can be argued about other forms of
experience and data recollection. This is why it is, in principle, possible to
see that something is not red: we only need to see that it is green, which is
incompatible with being red according to the theory of colour.
Priest’s argument for this is vision-centred, but it can easily be translated
into other forms of experience data recollection. His first step is to assert that
it is possible to see what is described by an atomic (observational) statement,
such as, for example, that a flower is red. From this follows the following
thesis.
Thesis 7. It is possible to observe that x is A, for some x and A.
The second step is to argue that we can also observe that something is
not the case. This should be the case when, for example, observing a yellow
rose we also somehow observe that is not red. To this we can object that
what we observe is only that the flower is yellow and that only by inference
do we know that the it is not red. But Priest offers another example where
we would not need this kind of inference for observing that something is
not the case. Consider, for example, Mario’s room thought experiment. His
whole life, Mario has been locked into a room where he could see the whole
chromatic spectrum with exception of the colour yellow, and she could only
see red flowers. However, one day Mario leaves this room and the first thing
she sees is a yellow flower, so he will observe that it is not red. With a similar
argument, Priest considers the following thesis to be justified:8
Thesis 8. It is possible to observe that x is not A, for some x and A..
The next step is to realise certain cognitive functions are involved in
vision, including categories of understanding such as the conjunction and
disjunction logical functions. For example, it is possible to see that a
certain photograph is of Ned or Ted, if they are identical twins and we see a
photograph of one of them without knowing which one is it. In other words,
it is possible to see that “this photograph is of Ted or this photograph is of
Ned.” In the case of the conjunction, by looking at the yellow rose we can
see that “the rose is yellow and the rose is not red.” Therefore, the following
thesis seems justified.
Thesis 9. If φ and ψ can be observed, then φ∧ψ can be observed, for some
φ and ψ.
8Priest’s original thought experiment was: “[Y]ou enter a room: the whole room is
visible from where you stand; there is no one there. You can see that Pierre is not in the
room.” (Priest 2006a, p. 143)
16
Figure 1: Impossible trident, by D. H. Schuster (1964).
However, it does not seem sensible to also assert that a contradictory
conjunction is observable. How would it be possible to see at the same time
that something is and is not? Priest tries to convince even those who consider
that any situation described by an inconsistency is impossible as follows:
Seeing impossible situations is quite possible. This is what we
perceive in various visual illusions. ... [T]here are many well
known impossible figures (of the kind, for example, employed by
Escher in his drawings); there are perceptual sets where people
report seeing things as simultaneously red and green; there are
situations where things appear to be moving and not moving.
(2006a, p. 121, see fig. 1)
Which justifies the main and most interesting thesis of his essay.
Thesis 10. If φ can be observed, then φ ∧ ¬φ can be observed, for some φ.
If it is possible to observe what is expressed by a contradiction, then
it may be possible to test inconsistent theories qua inconsistent. In the
next subsection we will examine the few proposals made for the testing of
inconsistent theories.
4.3 Testing inconsistent theories
There is an incompatibility between the principle of falsifiability and
inconsistent empirical theories. Since an inconsistent theory classically
implies all the statements of its language, it would be “compatible with all
propositions [and] there would not be even one capable of falsify it” (Piscoya
1995, p. 60). Since paraconsistent logics allow to modify this condition,
Piscoya proposes to redefine the principle of falsifiability in a more general
way.
Indeed, the requirement of falsifiability for scientific-empirical
theory demands that such a theory does not imply at least one
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proposition. Certainly the truth of such a proposition, not being
implied by the theory, would be incompatible with it and [...]
may be interpreted as a falsifying one. [...] Consequently, we
will reformulate more precisely the requirement of falsifiability
for scientific-empirical theories by stating that they are falsifiable
if and only if they are absolutely consistent. (1995, p. 67, my
emphases)
This proposal, however, has some shortcomings. First, as we saw in
section 1, a theory can be absolutely consistent but empirically trivial. In
such a case, it makes little sense to say that the theory is falsifiable because
it still “implies any conceivable observational prediction [...] and thus tells
us nothing about the world” (Hempel 2000, p. 79).
However, even if absolute consistency were required at the level of
observational statements, this definition does not clearly define the class of
potential falsifiers of an inconsistent theory. Piscoya’s proposal defines the
falsifiability of a theory not in terms of its potential falsifiers, but in terms
of its logical properties. A necessary condition for defining the falsifiability
of a theory is to clarify how this theory stands with respect to verifiable
observational statements. Piscoya’s proposal may be specified with a that he
suggested to me in a personal communication.
Definition 11 (Absolute falsifier). A sentence φ is an absolute (potential)
falsifier of a theory T iff any observational sentence follows from T ∪ {φ}.
This definition allows us to establish a logical criterion for falsifying a
theory. However, it excludes theories formalised in logics that are very
adamant to trivialisation and that, therefore, would not admit many absolute
falsifiers; e.g. the family of strongly paraconsistent logics from definition ??.
A paraconsistent logic does not rule out the existence of certain statements
that trivialise the theory. For example, in the calculus C1 of da Costa (1963),
da Costa (1974), and da Costa (1993), a theory T such that T ` ∗¬φ would
be trivialised by T ` φ, which means that φ is a potential falsifier of T`.
As a counterpart we have Jas´kowski’s non-adjunctive
approach (Jas´kowski 1999; Vasyukov 2001), where the conjunction
introduction rule does not hold for each pair of statements. In this way, if
we have T ` α and T ` ¬α, we cannot infer T ` α ∧ ¬α, which means that
the we cannot use the principle of explosion in the form α ∧ ¬α ` β. A
similar premiss is followed by the chunk and permeate strategy (Brown and
Priest 2004).
It seems then that, in these cases, any contradiction can be handled in
such a way that the theory is not trivialised. Therefore, a theory whose
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underlying logic is that of Jas´kowski or that uses the chunk and permeate
strategy will have very few absolute falsifiers. This could be seen as evidence
that certain logics are simply not suitable for empirical science. However, in
order not to discard a theory just because of its underlying logic, it is worth
redefining the class of potential falsifier so that it does not only include
trivialising statements.
One such proposal is done by Priest, who start disclaiming to know of
any empirical theory with contradictory observational consequences. The
contradictions involved in inconsistent theories, such as Bohr’s atomic theory,
would be theoretical rather than observational. The following proposal, then,
must be seen as potential approach to be taken if we ever were to test an
inconsistent empirical theory. Let T be a theory such that T ` φ∧¬φ, where
φ, ¬φ and φ ∧ ¬φ describe observable situations. T is rejected or falsified if
the situation expressed by φ ∧ ¬φ is not observed.9
This proposal presents at least two issues. First, if we stick to the
falsificationist programme, when a theory T implies an empirically verifiable
statement φ, its corresponding potential falsifier would be ¬φ. That’s why
we’re more interested in observing ¬φ than φ. If we take φ∧¬φ as a testable
consequence of T, then its negation ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ) would be a potential falsifier
of T. In most paraconsistent logics, including that of Priest (2006b, sec. 5),
this formula is logically equivalent to φ ∨ ¬φ, which means that observing
either φ or ¬φ would falsify T. It follows then that it is not possible to falsify
an inconsistent theory from its contradictory statements.
But even if we accept the verificationist paradigm, implicit in Priest,
we have problems. As we saw in 2.1, the logical empiricists did not ignore
that there is some arbitrariness to induction. Verifying a theory, in this
sense, partly depends on a convention since no finite number of statements
can definitively justify a theory. Such a theory can only be more and
more corroborated or, otherwise, falsified by experience. Thus, certain
observational consequences of the theory cannot be tested because we do
not yet have the necessary instruments to carry out such observations. If a
theory T has two observational consequences φ and ψ, then we have that
T ` φ ∧ ψ. But it is possible that φ has been observed, but neither ψ nor
¬ψ. Following Priest, we would have that φ ∧ ψ has not been observed and,
hence, we would have to reject T, which is does not seem sensible.
Malgrado tutto, Priest’s proposal has the strength that, if we were to
9“If a theory entails an observable consequence α and α is not perceived, something is
wrong, either with our theory or with our perceptions; something needs to be fixed. In
particular, then, if a theory entails β ∧¬β, where β is some observation statement, then if
such contradiction is not observed, something is wrong. As I have already argued, β ∧¬β
is a perfectly observable state of affairs.” (Priest 2006a, p. 148)
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actually observe φ ∧ ¬φ, the improbability of such an observation (cf. Priest
2006b, sec. 8.4) would give unprecedented support to T qua inconsistent.
But, in any case, it does not offer a solution for those who see only practical
use in inconsistent theories. It doesn’t work for those who believe that the
world is consistent, and inconsistent theories should only be used if we lack
a consistent substitute.
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